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MARTIN CARRIER
1 Rotes of Models in Science
Heavy emphasis has been placed an models in the philosophy of science during
the past decades. This feature is in part due to the fact that quite different enti-
ties are subsumed under the Keading `model'. Consequently, universal appeal to
models should not be taken to indicate that a single, uniform characteristic of sci-
ence is stressed unanimously. Talk about models may refer to distinct objects such
as scale models, visual representations, numerical solutions of equations.
simula-
tions, idealized or tentative hypotheses, the domains of application of theories and
many more ([Stöckler, 1994, pp. 46-53]: [Hartmann, 1999, pp. 328-329]).
1 want to focus an models as a means for bringing theory to bear an experience.
In the most narrow understanding, models specify boundary and initial conditions
that are requisite for employing laws for the purpose of explaining or predicting
phenomena. For instance, the laws of celestial mechanics taken in themselves en-
tail nothing
specific about celestial orbits. Rather, in order to arrive at claims about,
say, the solar system, boundary and initial conditions need to be adduced. They
express assuniptions about the composition of the solar system, that is. the mass
ratios involved, the positions of the planets at a particular time. and so on. Only if
laws are supplemented with conditions that address particular circumstances, can
these laws explain and predict specific phenotena. The laws of celestial mechan-
ics together wich these factual assumptions constitute a model of the solar system.
In general. models include laws of nature along with boundary and initial condi-
tions. Models are distinguished by this inclusion of factual elements which niake
them suitable for spelling out the consequences of some corpus of laws for some
type of situations
. This means that models are conceptually distinguished by their
local nature: they are restricted to a particular class of facts.
On the other hand. this view suggests that the nomological elements of models
all derive from some overarching theory or theories. Nancy Cartwright was the
first to point out systematically, that this i's not true. As she argues, it is extremely
rare in science that the models of a class of phenomena are shaped and dominated
by a high-brow theory. Rather, such `models of a theory' are most offen descrip-
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tively inaccurate. Carlwright's point is that these llaws are not fixed hy adding
thcory-in(Iuced corrections or other details whose consideration is suggested hy
the thcory. Instcad, the empirical performance of a mode) is improved, usually,
hy hringing to hear phenomenological laws or practical approximations. The ex-
planatory Kurden in science is Korne hy theory-independent auxiliaries, approxi-
mations and corrcctions ([Cartwright, 1983, Chap. 2-3, 6, 8], lCartwright, 1997;
Cartwright, 19981; see 1Ransey, 1997]).
Margaret Morrison agrees with Cartwright in that the concrete models radier
(han the abstract theory represen1 and explain the hehaviour of physical systems,
but she shows, an the other hand. that Cartwright overstates her case. Morrison
convincingly argucs (hat high-level theories do play a signilicant rote in structuring
thc phenomena and in suggesting ways to account for them. Theoretical principles
form an indispensahle part of the pertinent models and they hear a pari of lhe ex-
planatory Kurden for this reason. Moreover, phenomenological models are not. in
general, descriptively more accurate than lheoretical ones. But in accordance wich
Cartwright, Morrison also stresses that models invoke additional generalizations
without lheoretical hacking, and, of course, information about parlicular fac(s. In
sui, models essentially depend an theory-hut only in part ( [Morrison, 1998, p.
70], [Morrison, 1999, p. 39, pp. 61-631; sec [Winsberg, 2003, p. 106]).
1 follow Morrison's account in assuming that models rely an theoretical princi-
ples, other nomological assumptions and clainis about matters of fact to a varying
degree. Since many models thrive an these extra-theoretical elements, such mod-
els are not 'models of a theory'. They cannot he constructed an the I asis of an
ovcrarching theory. The necessary auxiliary assumptions may derive from another
theory or from the particulars of the situation at hand, and they serve to hridge the
ritt hetween (he lheoretical principles and the observations. In this sense, models
are supposed to 'ntediate' hetween theory and experience [Morrison and Morgan,
1999, p. 10, 181.
Morrison distinguishes between two procedures of model building. Construct-
ing a mode) typically starts with an idealized account of a phenomenon. A simpli-
licd version of the situation is considered at lirst in which perturhations and more
complex aspects are ignored. Only the gross 1'calures are represcnted in the model.
The ensuing process of 'de-idealization' fecds the more suhtle details hack into the
account. 111 principle, these are (wo paths this elahoration can Lake. One can spec-
ify theory-hasel corrections which Lake Gare of all the distortions present wider the
conditions at hand. This process may yield a convergent series of models so that
an unanhiguous picture emerges. This picture contains the unique theoretical rep-
resentation of the phenomenon. Morrison's exaniple concerns pendulum motion
in classical nechanics. In this case, the theory serves to hightight possihle distor-
tions and supplies the neans for their corrcction. The series of cnrrection factors
converges toward one coherent account of pendulum motion. That is, the accu-
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mulation of these theory-induced refinements gives an increasingly more adequate
picture of the phenomenon.
In other cases, by contrast, no such coherent account emerges. Rather, contra-
dictory models prevail. Morrison's chief example concerns the atomic nucleus.
The so-called liquid drop model treats nucleons analogously to particles in a liq-
uid drop: they move rapidly and undergo frequent collisions. This model is able
to account for the absolute values of nuclear binding energy and its approximate
dependence an nuclear nass. The shell niodel takes into consideration that nucle-
ons possess quantuni properties and. in particular. obey Pauli's exclusion princi-
ple. This model takes rare of nuclear spin, and adds small-scale corrections to the
nuclear binding energy as estimated an the basis of the liquid drop model. The
crucial aspect is that these quantum features cannot simply he added to the liquid
drop approach. No single, coherent picture of the atomic nucleus emerges; we
are left with incompatible models for different purposes. Examples like this sug-
gest the Interpretation that models partially represent a class of phenomena. They
render only some of the relevant aspects and cannot be filled in so as to furnish a
comprehensive portrait of these phenomena ( [Morrison, 1998. p. 68, pp. 74-75 ],
[Morrison, 1999, pp. 48-52]; see [Cartwright, 1983, p. 104]).
2 Methodological Features of Applied Science
The general messalte of the just-sketched account of models is that the particular
and the factual is no less important in science than the nomological or the universal.
Models incorporate the more concrete aspects of a situation and thereby serve
to connect theoretical principles with observations. This account was developed
for capturing methodological features of epistemically driven science. However,
applied science is more at the focus of attention in these days. A large amount of
research is done and sponsored because some technological innovation is sought.
What matters for science is practical success: the control of natural phenomena
and the intervention in the course of nature.
Applied science is of a diverse nature; it comes in varieties of different method-
ological orientation and different degrees of ingenuity. For instance, applied sci-
ence may proceed by deduction. In such cases, the applied scientist operates like
an engineer. He or she employs the toolkit of established principles and brings
general theories to bear an technological challenges. Novel devices are created,
but no insights into nature's workings gained. Another strategy widely employed
in applied science is trial and error. In such cases. the basic features of the prob-
lern area aren't yet understood: exploratory experimentation is used to accomplish
a preliminary understanding in the first place. Applied science of these sorts only
rarely stimulates epistemie progress.
Other instances of applied science are more productive epistemically. Such ap-
plied research is direeted at practical goals, to be sure. bot it brings about knowl-
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enge gains or produces new insights. Stich 'applica(ion-dominated research' is
the epistemieally fertile pari of applied science. It is applietl research in heing
driven hy concrcte pragmatic or technological interests and being directed at prac-
tical goals. But ipp1icalioti-(loiiiiiiatecl research is similar to epistemic research
in secking new solutions to scientific problems. It does not achieve its goals hy
stiaightforward deduction from estahlished principles, nor by tising trial-and-error
procedures for groping in the Bark. It rather hrings forth somelhing new, a novel
piece of knowledge. Application-dominated research operates at an intermediate
level hetween applied science simpliciter and epistemic research.
Applicd science in general is characterized by its pragmatic attitude and hy
ils commitment to die proper functioning of some device as its chief criterion of
success. In addition, applied science is pst under heavy pressure from economic
companies or political institutions alike to supply quickly solutions to practical
problems. Science is the lirst institution called upon if advice in practical niat-
ters is needed. The question is what the emphasis an the search for control of
natural phenomena tloes to science antl whether it interferes with the search for
knowledge.
On (he face of it, thcre are contrasting observations and arguments. One im-
Pression is that applied science is nnethndnlo,gically deficientt. The physicist Sylvan
Sehweher ohserves (hat 'the demand for relevance ... can easily become a source
of corruption of (he scientific process' and stresses the special role of 'scicntists
engaged in fundamental physics' in thal their cominunity is cummitted to the vi-
Slon of trulh (Sehweher 11993, p. 401). Therc are two influences an applied science
(hat Gould make Ihis concern of mcthodological deficicncy plausible, namely, the
prohahlc prevalence of a purely pragmatic attitude among applied scientists and
the overhurdening of applied science hy complexity.
First, as to pragmatism, il seeins that il 'a gadget works, everything is tine; no
further questions will be asketl. APPlied science appears to he governcd hy a prag-
matic attitude which hecomes manifest in a restricted scope of theorizing and ex-
plaiuing. Epistemic challenges that transcend imnediate practical needs might be
ignored. Second, as to complexity, applied science is characterized hy a specilic,
intrinsic penchant toward the complex. In virtue of its commitment to experience,
science in general necds to address etnpirical instances, to he sure, hurt not partic-
ularly intricate phenomena On the contrary, empirical tests orten proceed heiter
by focusing an the pure Gases, the idealized ones, hecause such cases typically
yicld a niore dircct access to the processes consitlered fundamental hy the theory
at hand. But applied science is denied the Privilege of epistemic research to select
iss problems according (o iheir tractahility; rather, ils research agenda is sei from
outside. Practical challenges typically involve a more intricate inlertwinemenl of
factors and are thus harder to put under control. Applied science cannot help hut
confront complexity.
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It appears plausible that scientists respond to such excess demands by adopting
tentative epistemic strategies. Likewise, the dominante of purely practical success
criteria tends to cut off research from any deeper epistemic interests. As a result of
both possible trends. applied science might resort to purely total solutions without
theoretical integration. Such local models might he restricted to particular sets of
circumstances and invoke ceteris-parihus laws, generalizations from different the-
oretical sources or generalizations without theoretical foundation. That is, models
invoked in applied science Gould he at once internally heterogeneous and differ
suhstantially from one another. Moreover, the causal claiins entertained might
be contextualized in that they only hold under 'üortnal' conditions and leave the
pertinent causal processes out of consideration. Pragmatic investigations plausi-
hly focus an such cause-effect relations that prevail under 'typical' conditions and
are thus usually sufficient for hringing about the effect. Likewise, applied science
might invoke pragmatic siinulation techniques which purste instrumentalist mod-
elling strategies and deliberately leave out what really happens in the system in
question. Knowledge gained in applied research contexts might look like a patch-
work of local and instrumentalist models, isolated from one another and lacking
deeper explanatory import.
But a eontrasting sein of thought sounds also plausible. The just-given argu-
ment suggests that applied science is tempted hy its practical nature to adopt tenta-
tive epistemic strategies and to abandon the goal of understanding. But one might
respond that the potential for intervention is linked with theoretical understanding.
This intuition of sustained epistemic quality control is based an the assumption that
superficial relations of the sort sketched will eventually fail to underwrite techno-
logical progress. Conversely speaking, theoretically understood causal relations
provide much more opportunities for Intervention than contextualized causal rela-
tions do. The former can more easily be generalized and applied to a wider Tange
of conditions: they are thus more useful in a practical respect. The theoretical
explanation or integration improves the prospect of bringing other factors to bear
an the process at hand and to twist the latter so that it delivers more efficiently or
inore reliably what is demanded.
Underlying this alternative account is the assumption that control is achieved
best hy bringing to bear methodological standards that also characterize under-
standing. namely, unified explanation and causal analysis ([Kitther, 19811;
[Salnon. 1984, pp. 135-157. pp. 206-238 1). On the one hand. these virtues cod-
ify what knowledge or understanding is all about. We understand a phenomenon
when we are able to embed it in a nomological framework, and we grasp a causal
relation when we can Lake account of the process leading from the cause to the
effect. On the other hand. such methodological virtues are also crucial for making
sustained technological progress possible.
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On Ehe face of it, tliere is a point to both arguments . If the proper functioning of
a device is the only achicvcment that counts , it can hardly he expected ( hat scien-
tists immerse themselves in theoreticai work in order to give a sound explanation
of the operation of this device. Right? Bot if reliahility of control and lrustwor-
thiness ol, inlervention can only he mainlained and ascertained hy accounling for
the mechanism underlying Ehe proper functioning of the device , flirre is reason to
assume that applied scic ntists would take pains to widerstand this mechanism the-
oretical1y. Righd'? So, (his is one of the philosophical issues that cannot he resolved
hy in-principle considerations . Radher , Ehe methodology of applied science needs
to he studicd by addressing concrete cases.
3 The Role of Local Models in Application -dominated
Research
1 mentioned a number of tentative epistemic strategies which might he invoked
in application-dominated research: local modeliing, pragmatic simulation tech-
niques, exploratory experinnentation, contextualized causal relations. Here 1 wish
to focus an thc role of local models.' The question is whethcr the models in-
voked in applied research mcrely conlain specific assumptions of narrow scope,
only loosely Lied logelher by sharcd principles. In other words, 1 explore whelher
the conecptual and nomological heterogeneity of applied research signilicantly ex-
cceds that of pure or epistemic science.
The lirst thing to he noted in this conduction is that the emphasis specifically
lies an research, not an applied science in general. A large number of relevant
challenges demand the development of technology rather than scientific innova-
tion. This mcans 'hat exlant knowledge is hrought to bcar an sonne issuc, and the
operation of an invention can die undcrstood by appcal to knowledge available he-
forehand. A known feature of nature is used for producing a technological fegt.
The development of optical switches is a casc in point. Light signals are used tor
modifying Ehe index of refraction of sonne suitahle mediutu. This change gives rise
to interference phenomena which are then einploycd for an extremely fast opening
or closing of optical gates without intermediate electron Ilow (Linsmeier [20011).
This is certainly a creative advancement in technology, hut the innovation only
lies in forging novel lies among elements of' extant knowledge. No new effect
was discovcrcd, no new lhcory was Iormulaled. But 1 wish to focus an Ihe struc-
ture of knowledge gained in applied research-in conlradistinetion to theorelical
knowledge that is marely hrought to bear an practical questions.
Correspondingly, it docs not militate against the methodological dignity of ap-
plied science that the models invoked in developing or designing apparalus are
fragnientary or known to bc false. For instance, models from geometrical oplics
See ICarrier, forthcumingl for Ihe. prohlem of contextualized causal relations.
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are widely used for designing optical instruments such as lasers. The path of light
is calculated an the basis of a superseded theory that leaves out known facts about
the physical nature of light. But this purely technological use implies nothing con-
cerning the methodology of applied research. Such models lack epistemic impact:
no new factual claim is inade, no new hypothesis is generated.
Turning now to application-dominated research proper. the worries about method-
ological deficiency are found confirmed to sonne extent. 1 brielly sketch three ex-
amples. The firnt one is taken from nanoresearch and features the disregard of
welcome anomalies. One of the top items an the nanoscale research agenda is the
attempt to build molecular wires: the current should be conducted through individ-
ual, ring-shaped organic molecules. After the effect of molecular conduction was
estahlished, researchers were satisfied. In particular, they failed to inquire into a
glaring discrepancy that had shown up along the way. namely, that the resistance
was rauch lower than anticipated. This unexpected finding increased the options
for practical use. No systematic attempts were made at clarifying the cause of this
welcome anomaly. An ad-hoc-hypothesis without theoretical or empirical backing
was offered and the case was closed with emphasizing the technological prospects
offered by molecular conduction ([Nordmann, 20031: see [Reed and Tour, 2000,
pp. 90-911). This failure to address anomalies and the missing attempts to eluci-
date the mechanisms underlying a practically promising effect tonfirm the suspi-
cion of methodological deficiency. The measured value of molecular conduction
was simply accepted as the basis of all further consideration. This essential pa-
rameter was read off from experience, and hardly any serious attempt was made to
link it with the System of knowledge. The anomaly was glossed over hy a purely
local adaptation. The narrow scope of theorizing and explaining manifest in this
example testifies that deeper epistemic interests were not pursued.
The second example concerns `giant magnetoresistance', a physical effect dis-
covered in 1988 and quickly explored by industrial research laboratories. This ef-
fect involves spin-dependent scattering of electrons and makes it possible to huild
extremely sensitive magnetic field sensors. Giant magnetoresistance underlies the
functioning of today's magnetic read heads; it is used for hard disks or magnetic
tapes. The qualitative explanation of the effect was suggested immediately after
its discovery, but building a suitable device requires knowledge of quantitative re-
lations. The avowed aim of the industrial research laboratories involved in this
research was to come up with what is sometinies called `design rules'. Such ex-
perimentally confirmed rules provide approximate relations among relevant pa-
ranieters (such as layer thickness or ferromagnetic coupling between layers) and
can thus be employed for inanufacturing read heads. Design rules of this sort are
extremely local. They apply to particular types of read heads only-with the result
that the design rules used by Philips don't work for IBM read heads. One realizes
that design rutes are part of models of a fairly restricted scope [Wilholt, 20031.
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The third example is taken from hiotechnology; it does not concern local mod-
els but contextualized causal relalions 1Carrier, forthcoming1. Still, this case like-
wise exhihits the restricted scope of Iheorizing in application-dontinated research
and thus underlines the importance of local approaches in applied research. The
hackground of this case is the present turn in cell hiology from genomics to pro-
teomics. In contrast to earlier views about rigid connections between properties of
a ccll and its genetic makeup, the interaction among proteins is now inereas1ngly
si ressecl. Whilc the conceptual and theoretical insufliciency of genomics is widely
acknowledged, biotechnologists tend to hold fast to invariant gehe-property rela-
tions in order to retain thcir `handle' for intervention. Stimulation of a certain gene
is usually suflicient for producing some cell property. That is, genetic manipulalion
is suitable for hringing ahout cl]ecls in a predictahle Iashion, alheit the reliahility
of Ihe relevant causal relalions is conslrained to particularconditions [Keller, 2000,
pp. 141-1421. Arguments from iRe biotechnological camp concede (hat genetic
cleterminism is supersecled and discarded in bioscience, hut insist that it mies un-
qucstioned in hiotechnology. The assumption of a close connection between gene
and cell property constilutes a lever for intervening in hiological processes. Genes
are tools for hringing about intended effects and for achieving biotechnological
progress. Scienti(ic truths are said to be unnecessary for Ibis purpose. Technology
aims at practical success which is accomplished by the identitication of levers to
pull and switches to press [Bains, 19971.
The upshot of all three cases is that models advanced in applied research are
somctimes of a fairly narrow scope and merely apply to a small set of circum-
stances. As a result, such models fall to provide deeper knowledge hut only Support
a specilic technological use. Scientific understanding and capacity of intervention
appear to he decoupled. In a sintilar vein, Helen Longino argues (hat in a context
like industrial manufacture the important goal is to huild a device that operates
in a desired way (such as a cell system for producing human insulin). In such a
context, she grants, understanding may not he necessary. Longino takes this as-
sumed variahility of methodological judgement as a contirmation of her pluralist
approach to science 1Longino, 2002, pp. 200-2011.
The general inipact of these considerations is that applied scientists might ap-
praise theoretical proposals exclusively an their potential for intervention. lt would
be sullicicnt for accepting such proposals (hat they enahle control. Achieving a
technological goal is of exclusive relevance; gaining understanding of nature is an
epistemic luxury that applied research cannot afford. Such methodological fea-
(ures of applied science nourish the suspicion that science Buffers frone Ehe grip of
practical demands. Theories of epistemic science are expected to excel in virlues
like explanalory power, predictive Force or unifying capacity. By contrast, applied
science seems to he characterized hy local models, super(icial generalizations and
theoretical heterogeneity. The exptanatory and unifying Kearing of theory appar-
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ently falls to extend to technological challenges. Ort the face of it, applied research
is methodologically inferior to epistemic science.
However, this conclusion appears to he premature and incompatible wich the
thrust of section 1 an the roles of models in science. After all. there is a strik-
ing contrast between the views of Cartwright or Morrison an extra-theoretical
nomological ingredients of models, an the one hand, and the just-rehearsed com-
mitment of epistemic science to unifying explanation, an the other. Models are
used in epistemic and applied science alike, and it is plain from Morrison's (or
Cartwrieht's) analysis that the former are less coherent and unifying than one
might have thought. For instance, Cartwright suggests that a general tension ob-
tains between accuracy and unification. The more precise the results are required
to be, the more dappled the conceptual resources have to be [Cartwright, 1983, pp.
104-1071. In otlier words, fundamental science likewise appears to employ epis-
temic strategies that might be considered tentative. So, let's turn to more advanced
cases and see if significant parallels between epistemic and applicative reasoning
turn up.
4 Model -building Strategies in Episteinic Research
Orte of the lessons to be drawn from Morrison's analysis of model-huilding strate-
gies in epistemic research is that the nomological Parts of models can only rarely be
derived in their entirety from overarching theory. 2 Such a theory typically leaves
a great deal of interstices to be filled by drawing an other nomological resources.
This lesson brings a changed understanding of pure or epistemic science in its
train. Namely, it is difticult for higher-order theories in general to reach the level
of concrete experience. And this is why such theories have a hard time guiding or
directing applied research. It is true, applied science Ras to tackle tlie demand to
address particularly intricate situations (see Section 2), hut the overriding tendency
is that universal principles don't excel in capturing the subtle details of experience.
This is a predicanient of science as a whole. In epistemic science it becomes mani-
fest as the difficulty of linking up theory wich fact, in applied science it materializes
as Ehe difficulty of translating general insights into working devices. Unaided uni-
versal principles often fall to extend to multi-faceted and complex experience. This
is why explanations both in epistemic and applied science sometimes fall short of
the ideal of unification; and this is why model-building needs to resort to strategies
that have the air of beeng tentative.
These considerations suggest the following twofold claim. First, the pragmatic
attitude as it prevails in applied science indeed contributes to lowering the method-
ological demands placed an models that are considered acceptable. This claim is
2Actually. it is a widely shared insight today that having accepted overaiching theoretical principles
at hand still leaves a tot of chatlenges for huilding models. This insight could also be attributed to lan
Hacking. Cartwright and Ron Giere (see [Winsberg. 2003. p. 120]).
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confirntcd hy The exantples given in Section 3. But, second, this reduction is less
ntarked than anlicipaled. That is, nu dei-huilding slrategies in applied research
are methodologically deficicnt-but to a snurller extent than anticipated in light
of Section 3. Lct me support Ihis second contenlion by presenting relevant exani-
plcs. 1 wart to show two Things. On the orte hand, epistemic science also resorls
to ntodel-huilding sirategies that look tentative and conies tip wich models [hat ap-
pcar local and heterogencous. On tue other hand, local models inay constitute all
epistenic virlue rat her than a vice. As Ihe case may he, local models may even
prontotc undccslanding.
Thc eonsiruction of -a fusion reactor is among the challenges of technology de-
velopntent. Orte of the relevant altempts is the so-called Tokaniak reactor in which
hydrogeil plasnta is conlined hy a suitahly slructured nwgnetic Field. The Treat-
ment ol The (01us-shaped plasnta proceeds hy dividing ihe relevant real tu into two
different sectors, the eore and the exlerior, characterized hy open or closed mag-
nelic leid surfaces, respectively. In fast, a continual transi(ion between these Iwo
reginies ohtains. But the theoretical treatment inlroduces a sharp houndary and
(Iltis creates two dislincl sectors. This procedure yields two different models that
apply, respectively, to diese sectors. ln the resulting overall account, these dis-
parate models are sintply joined, they are stitched together [Stölizner, 20031.
Piecing together disparate ntoclels ce•tainly looks like a pragntatically driven
and episteinically insuflicicnt strategy. What shoulcl have beeil considered a ]to-
ntctgeneous tuaieria1 wich gradual Transitions is divided into separate hoxes wich
discrete property changes at the houndary. Consequently, this houndary is delih-
erately artilicial so (hat thc realist comiii t ueni underlying epistenic research is
telinquished in favour of attaining a practical goal, namely, designing a ntccha-
nisnt of plasnta confinetuent. lt seens that application dominated research indeed
sull'ers front methodological delicicncy.
In fact the exantple does not support ehe eotie1usion. In 1904, Ludwig Prandtl
used a sintilar procedure in order lo give ehe linst empirically adequate account
of Ihe Ilow Of a viscous fluid. Such processes are governed by ehe Navier-Stokes
cquation which, however, is unsolvahle in general. Prandil's innovation was a con-
ceptual distinction hetween (wo regions of fluid flow: a thin layer near ehe surf:ace
of hodies (such as the walls of a water pipe or ohjeets in (he pipe) and ihe remain-
de•. In ehe linst region the luid edieren to ehe surface; no Slip occurs. Thc viscosity
is assumed to dontinate ehe flow. In the second region, ihe viscosity is supposed to
he negligible Both assuntptions are known to be incorrect. Water possesses a low
viseosity which is, consequently, neither• high, as in ehe linst case, nor zero, as in
Ihe second. This ntcans, in sunt. that Prandll invoked ideal1zations; in fact, lie de-
vised two idealized cases separaied hy a sharp houndary. These two cases could he
1reatcd mathentatically; the Navicr-Stokes equation becontes solvahle under such
simplil'ying consiraints IMorrison, 1999, p. 46, pp. 53-61 1.
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The cases of the fusion reactor and the water pipe exhibit a similar method-
ological pattern: two disparate models are stitched together [Stöltzner, 20031.3 A
uniform variation is replaced by a sharp houndary: a unifying treatment is sup-
planted hy two local models. But in the hydrodynamics Gase this pattern cannot be
attributed to application dorninance. Prandtl's work was epistemic research; it was
intended to resolve some glaring anomalies of hydrodynamic theory.
Local models play an important role in epistemic and applied science alike.
This methodological parallel is underlined inore strongly by the similarity of the
just-presented cases with the earlier example of using two conflicting inodels of
the atomic nucleus (sec Section 1). The liquid drop model and the Shell inodel
are incompatible but they serve to account for different properties of the nucleus.
Sintilarly. in the cases of fusion and fluid flow, the two disparate models are ap-
plied to distinct regions. All These examples converge in showing that likewise in
epistemic research (on nuclear properties or fluid flow) and in applied research (on
the fusion reactor), heterogeneous and contlictine models are einployed in order
to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of the phenomena.
A possihle response is that ntethodological defleiency is more widespread than
suspected initially and extends to parts of epistemic research as well. Tentative
strategies impair epistemic research, too. But such a complaint would go astray.
Orte of the presuppositions of the preceding discussion was that local modelling is
methodologically suspect, that it is detrimental to epistemic aspirations and pro-
duced hy strong application pressure. The assumption was that understanding is
generated hy overarching theories, while local modelling indicates a dorninance
of pragniatic interests. Bot this is not true-at least not universally. Local mod-
elling is not. in general, methodologically inferior. Imistead, such models may be
necessary to give an empirically adequate account of the phenornena and they inay
create understanding rather than detract front it.
First. as to entpirical adequacy. Explaining and predicting die entpirical prop-
erties of a plienomenon is no doubt among the goals of epistemic science. But to
succeed in dhis endeavour under complex circuntstances may require the inclusion
of particular conditions and considerations. Complaints about ehe speeiticity or
heterogeneity of the knowledge sources drawn upon are less than convincing if ehe
alternative is entpirical failure. Taking the particulars into account ntay he ehe only
chance for coming to ternts with the relevant phenomena in tue firnt place.
Consider a contrary case as an Illustration. Hydrogeological models tend to
operate wich idealizations of the waten currents and soll conditions. In applying
such ntoclels to the analysis of groundwater Ilow:these lintitations are disregarded
3The numerical treatment of shock discontinuities erhihits ehe saure feature: it imvolves piecing
together several partial solutions [Winsherg. 2003. pp. 122-1231. Accounting for shock waves is of
prime importance in seeial practical areas. bot it constitutes a theoretical challenge as well. Again.
ehe seemingh tentative procedure of stitching together locai accounts is found in epistemicatly relevant
research as well.
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with hic resull that the inferences drawn are unreliahle and frequently off the mark
IShrader Freehctte, 1997, pp. 153-154 1. In this case the trouhle does not arise
from indulging in cIelails and severing all fies to high-hrow theory. Quite hie
contrary. The prohlenr radier lies in the overreliance an the general theoretical
approach and the vain attempt to clerive the models from ihis framework. These
models fail hecause lhey are insufficiently local. In order to caplure the phenom-
ena, the unique, local conditions nc-ed to he integrated in Ihe model [Beven, 2001,
pp. 4-61. This strikes a Cartwrightian chord: in empirical respecl going local is
offen an asset Tather lhan a liability (see Section 1). And empirical adequacy is
certainly a ehiel'commitment of epistemie science.
Second. as to understanding produced hy local models, consider the hydrody-
namics example. The pertinent overarching law is the Navier-Stokes equation. But
even in cases in which Ibis equation is solvable, it does not provide a mechanism
or an intuitive access to the ohserved effects. The caleulation is like a black box; it
yields numbers bot no understanding. Similar ohservations have been Wade wich
respecl to Sehrüdinger's equation or the standard model of particle physics ( [Hart-
mann, 1999, p. 3291; 1Batlerman, 2000, p. 232]). By contrast, Prandtl's local,
unrealistic inodels provide a mechanisin and saure sort of causa) understanding of
the processes involved in Iluid flow.
The explanatory power of local models can also he identilied in other cases.
The laws of quantum chromodynamics and the models of• the pertinent nucleons
exhihit thc saure relation. Quantum chromodynamics is the fundamental theory of
nuclear interaction, yet it hals to provide an intuitive understanding of the relevant
processes and mechanisms. In response to [his defect, models are conccived that
are inspired by the formalism of the theory, bot cannot he deduced from it. More-
over, different such models are employed for explaining different properties. lt is
these niodels that specify thc relevant mechanisms and outline causal processes at
work [Hartmann, 1999, pp. 331-344].
The explanatory Impact of local models can he recognized in other contexts
as well. As Robert Batterman argued, understanding may he reached hy draw-
ing an idealized, simplified and approxinlate models. In contradistinction, laking
the details unrestrictcdly Info account and giving a lull-scale derivation of Ihe par-
ticulars of the relevant phenomena from First principles may ohscure their salient
features. One of Batterman's examples concerns phase Transitions. Models rely-
ing an relations helween macroscopic luan1ities-what Batterman calls `minimal
models'-can he employed for equally descrihing the hehaviour of' fluids and of
f•erronragnetic suhslances in the vicinity of what is called the critical point. Quanti-
ties like pressure and temperature or Inagnetizalion and temperature, respectively,
are c<mnected by the saure straightforward relation. This account disregards Ihe
distinct microstructures 11nderlying the (wo kinds of phenomena. The pertinent
models are local in that they explicilly ignore the universal physical principles that
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are acknowledged to govern the phenomena in question and instead draw an gener-
alizations that. due to the idealizations involved, do not hold true, strictly speaking,
of these phenomena.
Minimal models reveal that the behaviour of physical systems as diverse as
fluicls and magnets is identical if viewed from a particular angle. The invariant
pattern characteristic of phase transitions is hard to extract from an analysis of the
respective microstructures. The reason is that the microphysical details are dis-
tinct in each Base and thus fall to explain the einergence of a shared property. Such
challenges are best met by introducing quantities that do not reflect the underly-
ing microphysical differences. Minimal models provide simplified and idealized
accounts and they are able for this reason to highlight the coninion ground among
the diverse manifestations of a physical effect [Batterman, 2002. pp. 22-27 ].
The upshot is that local models are capable of playing a constructive epistemic
role. They may provide the only route to an enipirically adequate account and they
may create understanding where comprehensive theories may yield nothing but
opaque calculations. 1 tried to outline two such local pathways to understanding.
First, a web of more restricted accounts may offer intuitive access to the underly-
ing causa) chains while general theories may merely produce numerically adequate
outcome. Second, Batterman's minimal models provide understanding by unify-
ing phenomena that appeared disparate otherwise. Phenomena that are different
in appearance and wich regard to their microphysical structure-such as evapora-
tion and the loss of ferromagnetism during temperature increase-are shown to
instantiate the Same macroscopic relation. Minimal models forge links between
phenomena that are dissimilar as judged by their microconstituents and micropro-
cesses. These achievements suggest that local modelling should not be taken as an
epistemic failure across the board.
On the other hand, this case raust not be overstated. Comprehensive theories
also engender understanding-if of a different sort. In virtue of their generality,
they connect a vast number of phenomena and estahlish similarity relations among
huge classes of phenomena. Local models, in view of their local nature. fall short
of this standard. This holds true even of Batterman's minimal models since the set
of phenomena related by any such mode) is much sinaller than, say, the dass of
phenomena accounted for by the theoretical models of classical mechanics. Lo-
cal models thus fail, in general, to provide understanding in the unificatory sense.
But they frequently specify causal mechanisms. Roughly speaking. comprehen-
sive theories produce understanding hy unification. local models may contrihute
to understanding by supplying abstract laws with causal mechanisms. So, overar-
ching theories and local models may both generate understanding-each in their
own way.
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Note, however, that in no way do all local models provide underslanding. 1
gave a nuniber of examples to the contrary eifett (see Section 3). Local models
may encode nothingg hut soperficial relations hetween insignificant and theoreti-
cally harren quantities. They may he read off from the data and restricted to a
narrow ringe of parameters. My intention was to bring out the explanatory po-
tential of local models and envisage what they can achieve when they are at their
best.
The overall message is that epistemic and applied research resemble one an-
other more strongly 1han anticipated. While it is true that we find tentative epis-
temic strategics anef an increased level of superficiality in applied research, we also
encounter research stratcgies wich a clear epistemic Kearing. Applied research,
too, is at Icast in part conunitted to virtuos like unificalion and causal analysis.
Whereas these methodological criteria may have a traditional ring, they manifest
lhemselves in a less customary way. These methodological goals are pursued not
hy articulating comprehensive nomological principles hut rather hy huilding a weh
of interiinked and intertwined local models. Unification and causal analysis is not
implemented by erecting a hierarchy of laws of nature, hut hy piecing together a
network of models, cach restrieted in scope hut hooked up with many others by
shared assumptions.
5 The Question Dynamics of Applied Research
My considerations proceeded from the Following sei of suppositions: First, applied
research is characterized hy a preference For local models; second, this preference
is an indication of methodological clcficiency; third, this delciency is the result uFa
prevalence of purely practical concerns and of the overtaxing of applied science hy
complexity. The preceding live of argutnentation tends to undermine these initial
assumptions. Local modelling is not a distinct feature of applied research; local
models rather play a signilcant rote in epistemic research as well. And they du
so with good reason since they can he instrumental in fostering understanding. It
is true, some of the worries concerning the methodological inFeriority of applied
research are justilied. The nanoconduction example shows that glaring anomal es
are glossed over iF they don't interfere wich practical use. The magnetoresistance
case gives testiniony to the inclination to he satisfied with superficial relations of
iinmecliate hearing an technical problems. The genetics example hears witness
to the willingncss to adopt approaches known to he false il' they appear suitahle
for advancing technology (sec Section 3). Science may sufTer Fron application
pressure in methodological respect.
On the other hand, there is a methodological protection hui lt into applied re-
search that tends to uphold demanding criteria of acceptance and thus to keep the
epistemic loss at a moderate Ievel. Epistemic and applied research share important
methodological characteristics. And this is no coinei(lence hut rather brings out a
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distinctive feature of science: understanding tends to improve the options for inter-
vention. This has, no doubt, a familiar ring: knowledge is power. This result lends
credihility to the second train of thought above, intended to elaborate the intuition
of sustained epistemic quality control (see Section 2). Both unified explanation
and causal analysis codify what understanding is all ahout. We understand a phe-
nomenon when we are able to embed it in a nomological framework, and we grasp
a causa) relation when we can account for the process leading from the cause to
the effect. These saure virtues are also essential for successful research an prac-
tical matters. Unification forges links among phenomena and makes it possihle
to apply some result within a )arge domain. Causal analysis elucidates the steps
leading up froni the antecedent to the final state and thereby offers opportunities
for technological control. The effect can be modified and adapted by intervening
at one of the interniediate stages.
At a second glance, the above-given examples for the methodological deficiency
of local niodels (see Section 3) tend support this view. First, one of the research
groups operating in the field of nanoconduction explicitly aims to hook up the ob-
served effects with fundamental theory [Nordmann, 20031. Second. the `design
rules' sought for bringing to bear giant magnetoresistance an technology devel-
opment are not, in fact, established by induction. They do not originate from
some theoretically uninformed screening procedure. but they are rather theoreti-
cally derived and experimentally examined [Wilholt, 20031. Overarching theories
continue to play an important role in dealing with practical challenges. Third, in
contrast to the allegations of some biotechnologists, the substitution of genomics
by proteomics in bioscience had important ramifications an biotechnology. For
instance, one of the foci of recent biomedical research is represented by the ques-
tion which genes are actually switched on; that is, which genes produce proteins.
Questions of this sort transcend the genomic horizon and indicate that biotechnol-
ogy has entered the proteomics age [Carrier, forthcoming, Section 71.
Accordingly, science is faced with a question dynamics leading from applied
issues to fundamental ones. For methodological reasons. applied research tends
to transcend practical questions and grows into epistemic research. Practical chal-
lenges often bring fundamental problems in their train. Such challenges cannot
appropriately he tuet without treating these fundamental problems as well. Under-
standing is not among the explicit objectives of applied science, hut once in a while
it still produces epistemically significant insights. This feature 1 call application
innovation. It involves the emergence of theoretically significant novelties within
the framework of use-oriented research projects. For instance, conceptually rev-
olutionary innovations in biology such as `retrovirus' er `prion' were introduced
within the practical research context of identifying infectious chains. It follows
that the primacy of application need not pose a threat to the epistemic dignity
of science. Not infrequently, epistemic insight is the unintended by-product of
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addressing practical nceds lhorouglily
. Theoretical unilication an(] causal analy-
sis are inhcrent in hotte pure and applied research , because such n iethodological
virtuos promote understanding and Intervention at Ihe san ie time.
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